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Abstract
We introduce imperfect creditor protection in a multi-country version of Schumpeterian
growth theory with technology transfer. The theory predicts that the growth rate of any
country with more than some critical level of ﬁnancial development will converge to the
growth rate of the world technology frontier, and that all other countries will have a strictly
lower long-run growth rate. The theory also predicts that in a country that converges to
the frontier growth rate, ﬁnancial development has a positive but eventually vanishing eﬀect
on steady-state per-capita GDP relative to the frontier. We present cross-country evidence
supporting these two implications. In particular, we ﬁnd a signiﬁcant and sizeable eﬀect
of an interaction term between the log of initial per-capita GDP (relative to the United
States) and a ﬁnancial intermediation measure, in an otherwise standard growth regression,
implying that the likelihood of converging to the U.S. growth rate increases with ﬁnancial
development. We also ﬁnd that, as predicted by the theory, the direct eﬀect of ﬁnancial
intermediation in this regression is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. In addition, we ﬁnd
that other variables representing schooling, geography, health, policy, politics and institutions
do not aﬀect the signiﬁcance of the interaction between ﬁnancial intermediation and initial
per capita GDP, and do not show any independent eﬀect on convergence in our cross-country
regressions. Our ﬁndings are robust to removal of outliers and to alternative conditioning
sets, estimation procedures and measures of ﬁnancial development.
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david.mayer@cide.edu1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Most current theories of the cross-country distribution of per-capita income imply that
all countries share the same long-run growth rate (of TFP or per-capita GDP). Yet the
historical record shows that growth rates can diﬀer substantially across countries for long
periods of time. For example, Pritchett (1997) estimates that the proportional gap in per-
capita GDP between the richest and poorest countries grew more than ﬁve-fold from 1870
to 1990, and according to the tables in Maddison (2001) the proportional gap between the
richest group of countries and the poorest1 grew from 3 in 1820 to 19 in 1998.
The “great divergence” between rich and poor countries continued through the end of
the twentieth century. Although many studies2 show that a large group of rich and middle-
income countries have been converging to parallel growth paths over the past 50 years or so,
the gap between these countries as a whole and the very poorest countries as a whole has
continued to widen. For example, the proportional gap in per-capita GDP between Mayer-
Foulkes’s (2002) richest and poorest convergence groups grew by a factor of 2.6 between
1960 and 1995, and the proportional gap between Maddison’s richest and poorest groups
grew by a factor of 1.75 between 1950 and 1998.
Technology appears to be the central factor underlying divergence. Easterly and Levine
(2001) estimate that about 60% of the cross-country variation in growth rates of per-capita
GDP is attributable to diﬀerences in productivity growth, while Klenow and Rodríguez-
Clare (1997) estimate that in their sample about 90% of the variation is attributable to
diﬀerences in productivity growth. Although the level of productivity can be aﬀected by
many factors other than technology, such as geography and institutions that aﬀect the
eﬃciency of resource allocation, it is hard to see how substantial diﬀerences in the growth
rate of productivity persisting for such long periods of time can be accounted for by these
non-technological factors, which are themselves highly persistent over time. Instead it
seems more likely that divergence reﬂects long-lasting cross-country diﬀerences in rates of
technological progress.
These facts are especially puzzling when one takes into account the possibility of in-
ternational technology transfer and the “advantage of backwardness” (Gerschenkron 1952)
that it confers on technological laggards. That is, the further a country falls behind the
world’s technology leaders the easier it is for that country to progress technologically sim-
ply by implementing new technologies that have been discovered elsewhere. Eventually this
advantage should be enough to stabilize the proportional gap that separates it from the
leaders. This is what happens in neoclassical models where technology transfer is instanta-
neous (Mankiw, Romer and Weil, 1992), where technologies developed on the frontier are
not “appropriate” for poorer countries (Basu and Weil, 1998; Acemoglu and Zilibotti, 2001),
where technology transfer can be blocked by special interests (Parente and Prescott, 1994,
1999) and where a country adopts institutions that impede technology transfer (Acemoglu,
Aghion and Zilibotti, 2002).
This paper explores the hypothesis that ﬁnancial constraints prevent poor countries
from taking full advantage of technology transfer and that this is what causes some of them
1The richest group was Western Europe in 1820 and the “European Oﬀshoots” (Australia, Canada, New
Zealand and the United States) in 1998. The poorest group was Africa in both years.
2For example, Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992), Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992) and Evans (1996).
1to diverge from the growth rate of the world frontier. It introduces credit constraints into a
multi-country version of Schumpeterian growth theory with technology transfer,3 and shows
that the model implies a form of club convergence consistent with the broad facts outlined
above. In the theory, countries above some threshold level of ﬁnancial development will all
converge to the same long-run growth rate and all other countries will have strictly lower
long-run growth rates.
There are three key components to the theory. The ﬁrst is that because technological
knowledge is often tacit and circumstantially speciﬁc,4 technology transfer requires the
receiving country to invest resources in order to master foreign technologies and adapt
them to the local environment. Although these investments may not ﬁt the conventional
deﬁnition of R&D, they play the same role as R&D in an innovation-based growth model;
that is, they generate new technological possibilities where they are conducted, building
on previous knowledge.5 Accordingly our theory assigns to R&D the role that Nelson and
Phelps (1966) assumed was played by human capital, namely that of determining a country’s
“absorptive capacity”.6
The second key component is the assumption that as the global technology frontier ad-
vances, the size of investment required in order to keep innovating at the same pace as before
rises in proportion. This assumption recognizes the force of increasing complexity, which
makes technologies increasingly diﬃcult to master and to adapt to local circumstances.7
The third key component is an agency problem that limits an innovator’s access to
external ﬁnance. Speciﬁcally we assume that an innovator can defraud her creditors by
hiding the results of a successful innovation, at a cost that depends positively on the level
of ﬁnancial development. Because of this, in equilibrium the innovator’s access to external
ﬁnance will be limited to some multiple of her own wage income. Since wages are lim-
ited by domestic productivity, therefore a technological laggard can face a disadvantage of
backwardness that counteracts Gerschenkron’s advantage; that is, the further behind the
frontier it falls the less its innovators will be able to invest relative to what is required in
order to keep innovating at a given rate. The lower the level of ﬁnancial development in
the country the greater will be this disadvantage.
Our paper relates to several important strands of theory relating growth, convergence
and ﬁnancial-market development. There is ﬁrst the literature on poverty traps and in-
terpersonal convergence or divergence in economies with credit market imperfections, in
particular Banerjee and Newman (1993), Galor and Zeira (1993), Aghion and Bolton (1997)
3See Aghion and Howitt (1998), Howitt (2000), Acemoglu, Aghion and Zilibotti (2002), and Howitt
and Mayer-Foulkes (2002). The last of these papers implies three convergence groups, analogous to the
three groups of the present paper, but the disadvantage of backwardness that prevents some countries from
converging in that paper arises from low levels of human capital rather than from credit-market imperfections.
4See Arrow (1969) and Evenson and Westphal (1995).
5Cohen and Levinthal (1989) and Griﬃth, Redding and Van Reenen (2001) have also argued that R&D
by the receiving country is a necessary input to technology transfer.
6Grossman and Helpman (1991) and Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1997) also model technology transfer as
taking place through a costly investment process, which they portray as imitation; but in these models
technology transfer always leads to convergence in growth rates except in special cases studied by Grossman
and Helpman where technology transfer is inactive in the long run.
7A similar assumption has been shown elsewhere to be helpful in accounting for the fact that productivity
growth rates have remained stable in OECD countries over the second half of the 20th Century despite a
steady increase in R&D expenditures. See Jones (1995) and Howitt (1999).
2and Piketty (1997). In these models,8 all agents face the same production technology and,
unlike in our model, the same (productivity-adjusted) investment costs,9 and what gen-
erates poverty traps are either non-convexities in production or monitoring, or pecuniary
externalities working through factor prices. However, there is no technical progress and
therefore no positive long-run growth in these models, which therefore cannot analyze the
issue of long-term convergence in growth rates.
Another literature analyzes the eﬀects of ﬁnancial constraints and/or ﬁnancial inter-
mediation on long-term growth. Thus, Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990), Levine (1991),
Bencivenga and Smith (1991, 1993), Saint-Paul (1992), Sussman (1993), Harrison, Sussman
and Zeira (1999) and Kahn (2001) analyze the eﬀects of ﬁnancial intermediation on growth
in an AK-style model with no distinction being made between investing in technology and
investing in physical or human capital accumulation. King and Levine (1993b), de la Fuente
and Marin (1996), Galetovic (1996), Blackburn and Hung (1998) and Morales (2003) con-
sider the relationship between ﬁnance and growth in the context of innovation-based growth
models. De Gregorio (1996) studies the eﬀects on growth of ﬁnancial constraints that in-
hibit human capital accumulation. Krebs (2003) shows how imperfect sharing of individual
human-capital risk can depress long-run growth. However, none of these models analyzes
the process of technology transfer that we are focusing on, and therefore none of them is
capable of addressing the question of why technology transfer is not suﬃcient to put all
countries on parallel long-run growth paths.
The paper also produces evidence to support its main implications. There is already
a substantial body of evidence10 to the eﬀect that ﬁnancial development is an important
determinant of a country’s short-run growth rate, almost all of which is predicated on the
assumption of long-run convergence in growth rates. We extend this analysis to allow for
the possibility of diﬀerent long-run growth rates, using a cross section of 71 countries over
the period 1960-1995. Speciﬁcally, we estimate the eﬀect of an interaction term between the
log of initial per-capita GDP (relative to the United States) and ﬁnancial development in
an otherwise standard cross-country growth regression. We interpret a negative coeﬃcient
as evidence that low ﬁnancial development makes convergence less likely. Using a measure
of ﬁnancial development ﬁrst introduced by Levine, Loayza and Beck (2000) we ﬁnd that
the coeﬃcient is indeed negative, and is large both statistically and economically.
Our empirical methodology is similar to that of Benhabib and Spiegel (2002), who found
a negative interaction term between initial TFP and schooling and concluded that schooling
was a key determinant of whether or not a country will converge to the frontier growth
rate. We test the robustness of our results by including both schooling and an interaction
term between the initial GDP gap and schooling as additional regressors in our equation.
In addition, we repeat this robustness test using instead of schooling a large number of
diﬀerent variables suggested by other growth theories. In all cases the main implications
of our theory pass the test. We also present evidence to the eﬀect that the main channel
through which ﬁnancial development aﬀects convergence is productivity growth, as implied
8See Banerjee (2003) for a comprehensive survey of this literature.
9In contrast, in our model countries face a productivity-adjusted cost of innovation which increases with
its distance to the technological frontier. It is the interplay between credit constraints and this technological
heterogeneity which generates the possibility of long-term divergence.
10See the surveys by Levine (1997, 2003), and the book by Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine (2001).
3by the theory, rather than capital accumulation, and show that our results are robust to
elimination of outliers, to alternative conditioning sets, to alternative estimation procedures
and to alternative measures of ﬁnancial development.
2 Theoretical framework
We follow Acemoglu, Aghion and Zilibotti (2002) in casting Schumpeterian growth theory
in a simple discrete-time framework. There are m countries, who do not exchange goods
or factors, but do make use of each others’ technological ideas. There is a continuum of
individuals in each country. Each country has a ﬁxed population P, which for notational
convenience we normalize to unity. Thus aggregate and per-capita quantities are identical.
Everyone lives for two periods, being endowed with two units of labor services in the ﬁrst
period and none in the second, with a utility function linear11 in consumption: U = c1+βc2,
where 0 <β<1. Within each country the growth path is determined as follows.
2.1 The general sector
There is one multi-purpose “general” good, produced by labor and a continuum of special-






α di, 0 <α<1 (1)
where xt (i) is the input of the latest version of intermediate good i and At (i) is the pro-
ductivity parameter associated with it. The general good is used for consumption, as an
input to R&D and also as an input to the production of intermediate goods.
The general good is produced under perfect competition, so the price of each interme-







(We use the general good as numéraire, and P =1 ).
2.2 Intermediate sectors
For each intermediate good i there is one person born each period t − 1 who is capable of
producing an innovation for the next p e r i o d .T h i sp e r s o ni sc a l l e dt h eith innovator in t−1,
and if she succeeds (innovates) then she will be the ith incumbent in t. Let µt (i) be the
probability that she succeeds. Then:
At (i)=
½
At with probability µt (i)
At−1 (i) with probability 1 − µt (i)
¾
11Linear utility implies that people are indiﬀerent between investing in any country, whether technolog-
ically or ﬁnancially developed or not. We assume that all investment is locally ﬁnanced, but if β were the
same across all countries we could allow perfect capital mobility with no change in the analysis. Extending
our analysis to the case of strictly concave utility would allow us to analyze the possibility and implications of
capital ﬂo w i n gf r o ml e s st om o r eﬁnancially developed economies in accordance with Lucas’s (1990) oft-cited
observation that capital ﬂows from poor to rich countries rather than the reverse.
4where At is the world technology frontier, which grows at the constant rate g>0, taken as
given for now. The fact that a successful innovator gets to implement At is a manifestation
of technology transfer, of the kind that Keller (2002) calls “active”; that is, domestic R&D
makes use of ideas developed elsewhere in the world.12
In each intermediate sector where an innovation has just occurred, the incumbent is
able to produce any amount of the intermediate good using as the sole input one unit of
the general good per unit of intermediate good. In addition, in every intermediate sector
there is an unlimited number of people capable of producing copies of the latest generation
of that intermediate good at a unit cost of χ>1.13
So in sectors where an innovation has just occurred, the incumbent will be the sole
producer, at a price equal to the unit cost of the competitive fringe,14 whereas in non-
innovating sectors where the most recent incumbent is dead, production will take place
under perfect competition with a price equal to the unit cost of each producer. In either




1−α At (i). (3)
It follows that an unsuccessful innovator will earn zero proﬁts next period, whereas the









Substituting (3) into (1) we see that gross output of the general good will be:
Zt = ζAt
where ζ =( α/χ)
α
1−α.
In equilibrium the probability of innovation will be the same in each sector: µt (i)=µt
for all i; therefore average productivity evolves according to:
At = µtAt +( 1− µt)At−1.
12In Aghion, Howitt and Mayer-Foulkes (2004) we extend our analysis and results to the more general
case in which innovations do not result in an immediate jump to the frontier, so that:
At (i)=
½
bAt +( 1− b)At−1 with probability µt (i)








is the average domestic productivity at date t and b i sar e a ln u m b e rb e t w e e n0a n d1 .
13Thus imitation of a successful innovation is costless within a country, whereas we shall assume below
that, because of the well documented fact that technologies work diﬀerently in diﬀerent countries, moving a
domestic sector up to the world technology frontier is costly and requires a positive R&D investment.
14This requires the further assumption that χ<α
−α, which we now make.
5That is, the productivity parameter will equal At in the fraction µt of sectors that innovated
at t−1, but will remain equal to At−1 (i) in the 1−µt sectors that did not innovate at t−1,
and since innovations are distributed randomly across sectors the average value of At−1 (i)
among non-innovating sectors will equal the economy-wide average At−1.
Deﬁne the country’s normalized productivity as:
at = At/At.
Normalized productivity is an inverse measure of the country’s distance to the technological
frontier, or its “technology gap”. It follows that the gap evolves according to:




Since the general sector is perfectly competitive, the wage rate wt will be the marginal
product of labor in producing the general good:
wt =( 1− α)Zt =( 1− α)ζAt.
The fact that wt is proportional to domestic productivity At plays an important role in
what follows. For as we shall see it implies that technology investment in a country that is
credit-constrained will be strictly proportional to At.
Value added in the general sector is wage income, whereas value added in the interme-
diate sectors is proﬁt income. Per-capita GDP is the sum of value added in all sectors:
Yt = wt + µtπt =( 1− α)ζAt + µtπAt.
2.4 Innovations
In each sector the R&D investment needed to innovate at any given rate µt is governed by
the cost function:





At η,δ > 0
where Nt−1 is the quantity of general good that must be invested. We multiply e n by At to
recognize the “ﬁshing-out” eﬀect; the further ahead the frontier moves the more diﬃcult it
is to innovate. This eﬀect is crucial in what follows.
In our analysis below, we shall make extensive use of the inverse of the R&D cost function
e n. Namely, an intermediate producer who invests the amount nAt in R&D will innovate
next period with probability:15
e µ(n)=e n−1(n)=
³p





This condition guarantees that the equilibrium probability µt will always lie strictly between
0 and 1.
In equilibrium µt will be chosen so as to maximize the expected net payoﬀ:
βµtπAt − e n(µt)At (6)
in each sector, subject to credit constraints.
15Note that e µ(0) = 0, e µ
0 (n) > 0 and e µ
00 (n) < 0.
62.5 Equilibrium innovation under perfect credit markets
In this section we show that if innovators had unlimited access to outside ﬁnance all
economies would converge to the same growth rate. The level of each country’s growth
path might be diﬀerent because of country-speciﬁcd i ﬀerences in parameters such as β and
χ, but their long-run growth rates would all be the same.
Suppose accordingly that each innovator can borrow (from other young people) unlim-
ited quantities at the going rate r = β−1 − 1 subject to a binding commitment to repay.
Then µt will be chosen so as to maximize (6) with no constraint. This implies that µt = µ∗,
where:
µ∗ =( βπ − η)/δ,
with corresponding equilibrium R&D expenditure:
N∗
t−1 = e n(µ∗)At = n∗At.
It follows from this and equation (4) that the country’s technology gap evolves according
to:
at+1 = µ∗ +
(1 − µ∗)
1+g
at ≡ H1 (at) (7)
which converges in the long run to the steady-state value:16
a∗ =
(1 + g)µ∗
g + µ∗ ∈ (0,1).
Per-capita GDP in the steady state is:
Y ∗
t =[ ( 1− α)ζa∗ + µ∗π]At (8)
which grows at the same rate g as the technology frontier At,a sc l a i m e d .
2.6 Credit constraints
Now suppose that credit markets are imperfect. Each entrepreneur at the end of period t
is a young person with access to the wage income wt. Thus to invest Nt in an R&D project
she must borrow Nt −wt. Assume that if she pays a cost cNt she can defraud her creditors
by hiding the proceeds in the event that the project is successful. This implies that in
equilibrium the entrepreneur cannot borrow more than a ﬁnite multiple of her accumulated
wealth17 wt, as in Bernanke and Gertler (1989), and therefore she cannot invest more than:
νwt
in innovation, where ν ∈ [1,∞) depends positively on the hiding cost c.
16The result that a
∗ is strictly less than one reﬂects the fact that no country, even the most technologically
advanced in terms of its average productivity, will ever be the world leader in all intermediate sectors
simultaneously, because of the randomness of the innovation process. Thus the model is consistent with the
evidence of Baily and Solow (2001) to the eﬀe c tt h a td i ﬀerent countries are technology leaders in diﬀerent
industries.
17See Appendix A.
7This credit constraint will be binding if the unconstrained optimal investment n∗At+1 is
strictly greater than the innovator’s investment capacity νwt, or equivalently, after dividing
through by At+1, if:
n∗ >a tω, (9)
where
ω ≡
ν (1 − α)ζ
(1 + g)
.
We represent ﬁnancial development by the cost parameter c, or equivalently by the credit
multiplier ν (or by ω), on the grounds that a highly developed ﬁnancial system protects
creditors by making it hard to defraud them.
We see from (9) that: (i) for a given level of technological development at of the country,
domestic ﬁrms are more likely to be credit constrained if ﬁnancial development ω is lower;
(ii) for a given level of ﬁnancial development ω ﬁrms are more likely to be credit constrained
the further the country is behind the technological frontier (i.e., the smaller is at). This is
the “disadvantage of backwardness” induced by the existence of credit constraints.18
Thus ﬁrms in more advanced countries with
at >n ∗/ω ≡ a(ω)
will invest the unconstrained amount n∗At+1 in innovation and therefore will innovate with
probability µ∗,w h e r e a sﬁrms in less advanced countries with
at <n ∗/ω ≡ a(ω)
cannot invest more than νwt = atωAt+1 and therefore will innovate with probability
e µ(atω),
where the innovation technology e µ is given by (5).19
In that case at+1 will be determined according to:
at+1 = e µ(ωat) +
(1 − e µ(ωat))
1+g
at ≡ H2 (at). (10)
18Our model implies that, holding the credit multiplier ν (or ω) constant, among those countries that
are ﬁnancially constrained external ﬁnancing (equal to (ν − 1)wt) is bigger in those that are closer to the
technological frontier. However, the opposite is true among those countries that are not constrained, as the
amount of external ﬁnancing is then entirely determined by the gap between the R&D cost n
∗At,w h i c hi s
proportional to the frontier productivity At, and the amount of internal ﬁnance which is proportional to
current domestic productivity.
19This raises the question of why a constrained entrepreneur at t − 1 would not instead target a lower
technology level Bt < At, which would be less expensive given the assumption that the cost of innovating at
a given rate is proportional to the targeted technology level. In Aghion, Howitt and Mayer-Foulkes (2004)
we answer the question by showing that this alternative would be dominated, from the entrepreneur’s point
of view, by the strategy of always targeting the frontier. This relies on the fact that the innovation function
e µ(n) has an elasticity less than one, which in turn follows from the fact that the innovation cost e n(µ) is
strictly convex with e n(0) = 0.
82.7 The world growth rate
As in other Schumpeterian models, we suppose that the growth rate g of the global tech-
nology frontier is determined by the pace of innovations in the leading countries, none of
which are assumed to be credit constrained. For simplicity assume there is just one leader,
labeled country 1. Then:
g = σµ∗ = σ
β1π1 − η1
δ1
where σ>0 is a spillover coeﬃcient and the subscript 1 indicates a parameter value in
country 1.
3 Theoretical implications
3.1 Three dynamic patterns
In general, the country’s technology gap at will evolve according to the unconstrained
dynamical system (7) when at ≥ a(ω) and according to the constrained system (10) when
at <a(ω). Thus:
at+t = H (at) ≡ min{H1 (at),H 2 (at)}.
Note that H1 is a linear function with positive vertical intercept and a slope between 0 and










Countries will fall into three groups, deﬁned by the level of ﬁnancial development ω. The
evolution of the technology gap is illustrated for each case in Figures 1 ∼ 3b e l o w .
1. Convergence in growth rate, no marginal eﬀect of ﬁnancial development.
When ﬁnancial development is suﬃciently high that:
n∗
a∗ ≤ ω,
so that a∗ ≥ a(ω), then as shown in Figure 1, at will converge asymptotically to the
unconstrained steady state a∗ > 0. Per-capita GDP will be given by equation (8) in
the long run, which implies that the country will grow at the same rate g as the global
technology frontier in the long run. Increases in ﬁnancial development will have no
marginal eﬀect on either the steady-state growth rate or the steady-state technology
gap; these converge respectively to the values g and a∗ which are independent of ω.21
20S e ef o o t n o t e1 5a b o v e .
21That diﬀerences in the credit multiplier ω within this high ﬁnancial-development range do not aﬀect the
long-run technological gap results from the fact that the incentive constraint underlying ω (see Appendix A)
only places an upper bound on the amount borrowed by the entrepreneur. As soon as this constraint ceases
to bind, then ω becomes irrelevant in determining the dynamics of productivity. A diﬀerent model of credit
constraints, e.g. one that would rely on ex ante moral-hazard considerations and a continuous eﬀort choice,
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Figure 1: A country with the highest level of ﬁnancial development
2. Convergence in growth rate with a level-eﬀect of ﬁnancial development.






then H (a∗) <H 1 (a∗), so at cannot converge to the unconstrained steady state a∗.














Therefore, as shown in Figure 2, at will converge to a limit b a that is strictly positive
(except in the borderline case where
ηg
1+g = ω and b a =0 ) but less than a∗. In the long
run, per-capita GDP will be:
b Yt =[ ( 1− α)ζb a + e µ(ωb a)π]At <Y∗
t . (12)
This country will also grow at the rate g in the long run, because b Yt is strictly propor-
tional to At, as is Y ∗
t . Increases in ﬁnancial development will have no marginal eﬀect


























10steady-state technology gap b a, because they shift the curve H2 (at) up in Figure 2.23
A c c o r d i n gt o( 1 2 )i n c r e a s e si nﬁnancial development will also have a positive eﬀect on
the country’s steady-state per-capita GDP because of both the direct eﬀect on e µ and
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Figure 2: A medium level of ﬁnancial development
3. Divergence in growth rate, with a growth-eﬀect of ﬁnancial development.




then H (a∗) <H 1 (a∗) and H0 (0) < 1, so at will converge to zero, as shown in Figure
3. The following argument shows that in this case the rate of productivity growth,
deﬁned as Gt = At+1/At −1, will approach a limiting value that is strictly between 0









Gt =( 1+g)l i m
t→∞
(at+1/at) − 1=( 1+g)ω/η ∈ (0,g).
Thus the steady-state growth rate will be strictly less than the frontier growth rate g












24Aghion, Howitt and Mayer-Foulkes (2004) show that per-capita GDP grows at the same asymptotic rate
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Figure 3: The lowest level of ﬁnancial development
3.2 Summary
In summary, the two main implications of our theory are that:
1. the likelihood that a country will converge to the frontier growth rate increases with
its level of ﬁnancial development, and
2. in a country that converges to the frontier growth rate, ﬁnancial development has a
positive but eventually vanishing eﬀect, ceteris paribus, on the steady-state level of
per-capita GDP relative to the frontier.
4 Credit and convergence: Evidence
In this section we confront our theoretical predictions with evidence. After describing our
data, we test implications 1 and 2 above with a cross-country growth regression involving an
interaction term between the log of initial GDP per capita and ﬁnancial development.25 This
test provides strong evidence for our model and for the general proposition that whether
or not a country converges to the frontier growth rate depends on its level of ﬁnancial
development.
25We do not pursue a panel-data approach because we believe that ﬁnancial development is imperfectly
measured and persistent, which means that its growth eﬀects are likely to be underestimated by a panel-
data approach relative to a cross-section approach. (See Hauk and Wacziarg, 2004.) This may explain
why Benhabib and Spiegel (1997, 2000) found no signiﬁcant interaction between initial GDP and ﬁnancial
development using panel data on 92 countries from 1960-85.
124.1 Data
We do not have a direct empirical measure of the parameter ν or ω which our theory takes
as an indicator of ﬁnancial development. Instead we follow the usual practice of using a
measure of ﬁnancial intermediation to proxy for ﬁnancial development. We analyze cross-
sectional data26 on 71 countries over the period 1960-1995, taken from Levine, Loayza and
Beck (2000) (LLB) who found a strongly positive and robust eﬀect of ﬁnancial interme-
diation on short-run growth in a regression with initial GDP on the right hand side. We
follow LLB in using private credit as our preferred measure of ﬁnancial development. This
is the value of credits by ﬁnancial intermediaries to the private sector, divided by GDP. It is
LLB’s preferred measure because it excludes credit granted to the public sector and credit
granted by the central bank and development banks. We also report results below using
alternative measures.
Figures 4 and 5 show that the raw data are roughly consistent with implications 1
and 2. Figure 4 plots the average growth rate of per-capita GDP over the sample period
against the average level of ﬁnancial development. Except for the countries with the three
highest growth rates, which are clearly above their steady-state values, the scatter diagram
appears consistent with a positive eﬀect of ﬁnancial development on growth that vanishes at
approximately Greece’s level of ﬁnancial development (39%), as predicted by the implication
1. Figure 5 plots the average log of per-capita GDP on the vertical axis. It appears consistent
with a positive eﬀect of ﬁnancial development on the level of GDP which vanishes once










































































Figure 4: Financial development and long-run growth of per-capita GDP
26See Appendix B for detailed description and sources of data.
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Figure 5: Financial development and long-run average per-capita GDP
These ﬁgures do not control for the eﬀects of initial GDP or any other possible inﬂuences
on a country’s growth path. Nor do they deal with the problem of possible endogeneity of
ﬁnancial development. For these we turn to the following regression results.
4 . 2 G r o w t hr e g r e s s i o nw i t ha ni n t e r a c t i o nt e r m
Our theoretical model can be approximated by the following growth regression:27
gi − g1 = β0 + βfFi + βy · (yi − y1)+βfy · Fi · (yi − y1)+βxXi + εi (13)
where g denotes the average growth rate of per-capita GDP, F the average level of ﬁnancial
development, y the initial (1960) log of per-capita GDP, Xi a set of other regressors and εi
a disturbance term with mean zero. Country 1 is the technology leader, which we take to
be the United States. This is a standard growth regression except for the interaction term
Fi · (yi − y1).
Deﬁne b yi ≡ yi − y1, country i’s initial relative per-capita GDP. Under the assumption
that βy + βfyFi 6=0we can rewrite (13) as:
gi − g1 = λi · (b yi − b y ∗
i )
where the steady-state value b y ∗
i is deﬁned by setting the RHS of (13) to zero:
b y ∗
i = −
β0 + βfFi + βxXi + εi
βy + βfyFi
(14)
and λi is a country-speciﬁc convergence parameter:
λi = βy + βfyFi (15)
27See Appendix C of our (2004) working paper for the details of the approximation.
14that depends on ﬁnancial development.
A country can converge to the frontier growth rate if and only if the growth rate of its
relative per-capita GDP depends negatively on the initial value b yi; that is if and only if the
convergence parameter λi is negative. Thus the likelihood of convergence will increase with
ﬁnancial development (implication 1 above) if and only if:
βfy < 0. (16)
Since this implication constitutes the central proposition of our theoretical model, our main
objective in estimating (13) will be to see whether or not the estimated interaction coeﬃcient
is indeed signiﬁcantly negative.












Assume that all countries lag the United States in steady state: b y ∗
i ≤ 0.T h e n i f ( 1 6 )
holds, ﬁnancial development will have a positive long-run eﬀect on per-capita GDP of each
(non-leader) country that converges if and only if βf ≥ 0. For then the numerator of (17)
will be positive. Moreover, this eﬀect will eventually vanish (when F reaches the leader’s
level) if and only if the direct eﬀect is equal to zero:
βf =0 . (18)
So if we were to ﬁnd that (18) held in addition to our main prediction (16), this would
corroborate implication 2. If instead we were to ﬁnd that βf > 0 then the estimated eﬀect
of ﬁnancial development on b y∗
i would never vanish, even for the leader, whereas βf < 0
would imply a negative eﬀect for countries close to the leader.
4.2.1 Regression results
The ﬁnancial development variable F in (13) may be endogenous because of feedback from
growth to ﬁnance, or because of the common eﬀects of omitted variables on both growth
and ﬁnance. Moreover, endogeneity of F is likely to entail endogeneity of the interaction
variable F · (y − y1). To deal with this problem we estimated (13) using instrumental
variables, instrumenting for F and F · (y − y1) using legal origins (L) and legal origins
interacted with initial relative output (L · (y − y1)).
Legal origins is a set of three zero-one variables, used ﬁrst in the economics literature
by La Porta et al. (1997, 1998) and further extended to all 71 countries by LLB, indicating
whether the country’s legal system is based on French, English or German traditions (the
omitted case is Scandinavian). La Porta et al. argue that the main eﬀect of L is on the
rights of investors and creditors. LLB conclude that L constitutes a good set of instruments
for ﬁnancial development because they were established too long ago to suﬀer from reverse
causation, they have a strong eﬀect on ﬁnancial development and their main eﬀects on
growth should be through ﬁnancial channels. We used the interacted variables L · (y − y1)
as additional instruments to model the interaction term F·(y − y1), because using L without
L·(y − y1) resulted in too much collinearity between the ﬁtted values of F and F ·(y − y1)
15to identify the crucial coeﬃcients βf and βfy. We defer further discussion of the instruments
until the next section.
Our main results are presented in the ﬁrst column of Table 1, which reports the slope-
coeﬃcient estimates for the case where there are no other regressors X. These results
show that ﬁnancial development interacted with initial relative output has a signiﬁcantly
negative eﬀect (βfy = −0.061 < 0), bearing out the main implication of the theory to the
eﬀect that convergence depends positively on ﬁnancial development. They also fail to reject
the hypothesis that the direct eﬀect of ﬁnancial development βf is zero, thus bearing out
our theoretical implication of a positive but vanishing steady-state eﬀect.28
TABLE 1 HERE
These ﬁndings are signiﬁcant quantitatively as well as statistically, because they imply
that countries will indeed belong to diﬀerent convergence clubs. Speciﬁcally, a country can
converge to the frontier growth rate if and only if its convergence parameter (15) is negative;




which according to our estimates equals 25 percent. Just over half the countries in our
sample (37 of 71) exceed this critical value. Figure 6 shows the estimated convergence
parameter as a function of private credit, over the observed range of F, with 2-standard-
deviation bands. As indicated in Table 2, the estimated parameter is at least two standard
deviations below zero for 30 countries, the group most likely to converge in growth rate,
and two standard deviations above zero for 7 countries, those most likely to diverge. The
average estimated convergence parameter in the sample is −0.82, which implies an annual
convergence rate of almost 5%.
28The wide conﬁdence intervals for βf are also consistent with a quantitatively large direct eﬀect of
ﬁnancial development, although as pointed out below the point estimate of βf indicates that for most
converging countries the eﬀect will be quantitatively quite small.































Figure 6: Estimated convergence parameter over the observed rate of private credit.
Positive values imply nonconvergence.
TABLE 2 HERE
Another measure of the economic signiﬁcance of our parameter estimates is the size of
the implied eﬀect of ﬁnancial development on a converging country’s steady-state relative
output. As predicted by implication 2 of our theoretical analysis, this eﬀect is a diminishing
function of ﬁnancial development. Speciﬁcally, a one-standard-deviation increase in private
credit (28 percentage points) would raise steady-state GDP by 21 percent in Belgium, the
(estimated) converging country with the smallest level of private credit. But the eﬀect
would be less than 8 percent in every other converging country, and less than 1 percent for
each of the 30 “most likely to converge” countries.
The next two columns of Table 1 show that our results are robust to the inclusion of
other regressors. Speciﬁcally, column 2 uses LLB’s policy conditioning set, which includes
average years of schooling in 1960, government size, inﬂation, the black market exchange-
rate premium and openness to trade. Column 3 uses their full conditioning set, which
includes the policy conditioning set plus measures of political stability and ethnic diversity.
As these two columns indicate, the sign, size and signiﬁcance of the crucial coeﬃcients βf
and βfy remain virtually unchanged across alternative conditioning sets.
The remaining columns report the results when three alternative measures of ﬁnancial
development are used. The ﬁrst is liquid liabilities, which is currency plus demand and
interest-bearing liabilities of banks and non-bank ﬁnancial intermediaries, divided by GDP.
T h i si sac o m m o n l yu s e dm e a s u r eo fﬁnancial development, although it includes liabilities
backed by credits to the public sector and may involve double counting. The second al-
ternative measure is bank assets, the ratio of all credits by banks (but not other ﬁnancial
intermediaries) to GDP. The third is commercial-central bank, the ratio of commercial bank
assets to the sum of commercial plus central bank assets, which has been used by others al-
though it is not so much a measure of ﬁnancial development as a measure of what fraction of
17credit is issued by private intermediaries. Our main results (βfy < 0 and βf =0 ) are robust
to all three alternative measures, although in the case of commercial-central bank (our least
preferred measure ex ante)t h ec o e ﬃcient estimates all lose their statistical signiﬁcance. As
in the case of private credit, in all three cases the sign, size and signiﬁcance of the crucial
coeﬃcients βf and βfy remain virtually unchanged across alternative conditioning sets.29
We checked the robustness of our results against outliers by removing all countries with
a residual more than three standard deviations from zero and then re-estimating. We also
did this using two standard deviations instead of three. We did this for each of the ﬁrst 9
cases in Table 1. The coeﬃcient βfy never changed sign and its statistical signiﬁcance was
always even larger than reported in Table 1, while βf was never signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from
zero. Thus it seems that the results reported in Table 1 are not driven by outliers.
4.2.2 Instruments
We tested the strength of our instruments with the usual F-tests of joint signiﬁcance in the
ﬁrst-stage regressions of F and F · (y − y1). The p-values reported in the ﬁrst two rows of
the lower panel of Table 1 indicate that the instruments passed this test at the 1% level in
all three equations involving private credit, our preferred measure of ﬁnancial development,
in all equations involving bank assets and in all but one involving liquid liabilities. The
instruments passed at the 10% signiﬁcance level in all equations not involving commercial-
central bank. Because of our a priori doubts as to the suitability of the commercial-central
bank measure, we believe that the other three measures are telling us the right message.
These results conﬁr ma n de x t e n ds i m i l a rﬁndings by LLB. However, we have added to
their analysis the three interacted instruments L · (y − y1), and it is important that they
have additional explanatory power. Accordingly the third row of the lower panel of Table 1
reports the p-value of an F-test of the hypothesis that all three interacted instruments are
insigniﬁcant in both ﬁrst-stage regressions. The hypothesis is rejected at the 1% level in all
equations except those using the suspect commercial-central bank measure. Thus our ad-
dition of the interacted instruments does not appear to have created a “many-instruments”
problem.
From here on we omit the commercial-central bank measure from our analysis, on the
grounds that for our purposes it is ap r i o r iinferior to the other measures and behaves
empirically very diﬀerently than the others.
To be valid our legal-origins instruments must not aﬀect growth through any channel
other than ﬁnance, since otherwise the eﬀects we are attributing to ﬁnance might actually
be eﬀects of these non-ﬁnancial channels. This restriction might appear questionable be-
cause for example diﬀerent legal systems could result in diﬀerent regulatory environments
that aﬀect barriers to entry as argued by Djankov et al. (2000). Therefore we tested the
restriction using the standard Sargan test, whose null hypothesis is that the instruments
are uncorrelated with the IV residuals. If our instruments were aﬀecting growth through
an omitted non-ﬁnancial variable, then the Sargan test should reject the null. However,
29Although our theory does not rule out non-ﬁnancial determinants of steady-state output and growth,
the fact that our estimated eﬀects of ﬁnancial development are independent of other conditioning variables
suggests that we can safely treat the inﬂuence of those other determinants as part of the error term in the
equations with empty conditioning sets.
18the large p-values reported in the fourth row of the lower panel of Table 1 show that the
instruments pass the test in all cases.
Again, these results conﬁr ma n de x t e n dt h eﬁndings of LLB with respect to the 3 main
instruments L. We tested the speciﬁc validity of our interacted instruments L·(y − y1) with
a C-test. The large p-values in ﬁfth row of the lower panel of Table 1 indicate that the
instruments pass this test in all cases. The large p-values in the sixth row indicated that
we also cannot reject the exogeneity of initial relative income.
Another way to test for instrument validity is to include in the equation those variables
that represent the alternative non-ﬁnancial channels through which the instruments might
aﬀect growth. If these non-ﬁnancial channels are at work then the new regressors should
rob our ﬁnancial variables of explanatory power. T os o m ee x t e n tt h er e s u l t so fT a b l e1
already constitute such a test, but the conditioning sets there do not include any interaction
terms between the extra regressors and initial relative output. So they leave open the
possibility that our main result, the strong negative eﬀect on growth of the interaction
between ﬁnancial development and initial relative output, is coming from the explanatory
power of the interacted instruments L · (y − y1) and that this explanatory power derives
from correlation between the interacted instruments and some omitted interacted variable.
Table 5 below provides strong evidence that this theoretical possibility is not what is
driving our results. As we explain in more detail below, Table 5 reports the estimates
that result from including each of a long list of alternative regressors, including one that
measures regulatory entry barriers, both directly and interacted with initial relative output.
But in no case does the inclusion aﬀect our main results, and in no case does the alternative
regressor or its interaction have signiﬁcant explanatory power, except for one marginally
signiﬁcant eﬀect that appears to have the wrong sign. If our legal-origins instruments are
working through some non-ﬁnancial channel then it must be one that cannot be measured
or has not been brought to our attention.
Our ﬁnal check on instrument validity was to re-estimate Table 1 using alternative
instruments. Speciﬁcally, we used the log of settler mortality, which Acemoglu, Johnson
and Robinson (2001) have argued is a good instrument for modern institutions in formerly
colonized countries. To model the interacted ﬁnancial development variable we also used
the log of settler mortality interacted with initial relative output as a second instrument.
The results are displayed in Table 3 below.
TABLE 3 HERE
This re-estimation produces support for our main hypotheses (βfy < 0 and βf =0 ),
because the estimated βfy is always negative and the estimate of βf is always statistically
indistinguishable from zero. The statistical signiﬁcance of βfy is generally much lower than
in Table 1, but we attribute this largely to the smaller sample size. Data on settler mortality
are available only for 41 ex-colonies in our 71-country data set.
We prefer to work mainly with our legal-origins instruments rather than settler mortality
because we do not want to throw 30 countries out of our data set and because in this data
set the settler mortality instruments have relatively little explanatory power for the two
ﬁnancial development variables, as indicated by the large p-values of the ﬁrst-stage F-tests
19in the lower panel of Table 3, especially when there is a non-empty set of conditioning
variables.30
I ns u m m a r y ,w eb e l i e v et h a tt h ee ﬀects of ﬁnancial development on convergence that
we ﬁnd empirically are not artifacts of our use of legal-origins instruments, because the in-
struments pass standard statistical tests, the eﬀects are robust to controlling for alternative
channels through which legal origins might inﬂuence growth, and to the extent that data
limitations permit we have reproduced our main results using alternative instruments.31
4.2.3 Productivity
As a further test of our theory we examined whether the eﬀects of F and F · (y − y1) on
per-capita GDP growth were work through productivity growth, as implied by the theory,
instead of working just through capital accumulation.32 Speciﬁcally, we re-estimated the
basic growth equation (13) using productivity growth as the dependent variable instead of
growth in per-capita GDP, and interpreting y as the log of aggregate productivity in 1960
instead of the log of per-capita GDP. We took our productivity variable from Benhabib and
Spiegel (2002). The results are presented in Table 4 below.
TABLE 4 HERE
These results are similar to what we obtained using per-capita GDP. Speciﬁcally, the
crucial interaction coeﬃcient βfa is still negative and signiﬁcant at the 1% level in all
equations, with magnitudes similar to Table 1. Also the coeﬃcient βf of F remains not
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero, except in the case of speciﬁcation 4, where it is signiﬁcant
at the 10% level. As before, the results are stable across conditioning sets and our legal-
origins instruments pass continue to pass the tests for strength and validity.
4.2.4 Alternative explanations of divergence
Perhaps what prevents poor countries from converging in growth rate is not lack of ﬁnancial
development but lack of education, or perhaps ﬁnancial development matters for growth
only because it facilitates investment in schooling, as in Galor and Zeira (1993). Or maybe
divergence is explained by some other variable that is associated with a low initial level of
GDP, or with a low level of private credit.33 Table 5 addresses these questions by checking
30Beck, Levine and Demirgüç-Kunt (2003) and Acemoglu and Johnson (2003) ﬁnd that settler mortality is
a stronger instrument than legal origins for ﬁnancial development. This may be partly because they do not
include in their equations initial GDP, which in our analysis robs settler mortality of much of its explanatory
power.
31We found the same results using as instruments the initial (1960) value F0 of ﬁnancial development and
F0 · (y − y1). The only exception was the case using liquid liabilities with the full conditioning set, where
the p-value of the interaction coeﬃcient rose to 12%.
32Our procedure follows closely that of King and Levine (1993a) and Beck, Levine and Loayza (2000),
who used a similar framework without the interaction terms.
33Another interpretation of our ﬁnding of a negative interaction coeﬃcient βfy is that entrepreneurs in
poor countries have relatively few alternatives to borrowing from ﬁnancial intermediaries because of weak or
non-existent equity and bond markets. To the extent that weak equity and bond markets are a by-product
of weak investor protection, the same factor that our theory is focusing on, this alternative interpretation is
complementary with ours.
20whether the eﬀect of ﬁnance on convergence is robust to including a possible eﬀect of initial
relative output, schooling or a host of other variables on convergence.
Speciﬁcally, we included as an additional regressor the square of initial relative output,
(y − y1)
2. If this term were to have a signiﬁcant negative coeﬃcient βyy it might indicate
that what keeps poor countries from joining the convergence club is just being poor to start
with, or something other than ﬁnance that is correlated with being poor to start with. Next
we included as additional regressors not (y − y1)
2 but the variable school - average years
of schooling in 1960 - and also the interaction term school · (y − y1). If the latter were
to have a signiﬁcant negative coeﬃcient it might indicate that lack of education is what
keeps poor countries from joining the convergence club, for the same reason that a negative
interaction eﬀect with ﬁnancial development indicates that lack of ﬁnance is what keeps
them from converging. We repeated the same procedure with 31 other variables that have
been suggested in the literature. These include alternative schooling variables, geographical
variables, variables measuring population health, policy variables, variables indexing the
degree of sociopolitical stability, and a list of 12 institutional variables.
TABLE 5 HERE
If our results were fragile, if the determinant of convergence were not ﬁnancial devel-
opment but something else that was just correlated with ﬁnancial development, or if our
legal instruments were working on growth and convergence primarily through some chan-
nel other than ﬁnancial development, then the addition of at least some of these variables
and their interaction with initial relative output should destroy the explanatory power of
F · (y − y1) in our growth regression, or make the coeﬃcient βf on F signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
from zero. But the results of Table 5 show otherwise. The estimated sign of the coeﬃcient
βfy remains negative in all cases, and statistically signiﬁcant in all cases except when the
alternative variable is settler mortality, a case in which, as mentioned above, the number of
observations is very small.34
According to Table 5 in all cases the coeﬃcient βf of F remains not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
from zero when these alternative variables are included in the regression. Moreover, the
only case in which the interaction between an alternative variable and initial relative output
was statistically signiﬁcant was that of bureaucratic eﬃciency, which came in with the
wrong sign, indicating that convergence is less likely with a more eﬃcient bureaucracy. The
lower panel of Table 5 indicates that our instruments remained strong except for a few
institutional variables for which there was a relative small number of observations, and that
they continued to pass the Sargan test.35
34We explored this single exception further by pooling the 41 ex-colonies with the others. We set settler
mortality equal to the New Zealand value (the lowest in the data) for all non-ex-colonies and included in the
regression a dummy for non-ex-colony and an interaction between this dummy and initial relative output.
This formulation assumes that being an ex-colony has an eﬀect on growth and convergence but not on the
growth eﬀects of having more ﬁnancial development. The results are displayed in the last column of Table
5. They conﬁrm our main predictions, and suggest that the only exception in Table 5 to the ﬁnding of a
signiﬁcantly negative interaction coeﬃcient may indeed be attributable to a small sample size.
35To guard against the possibility that these results are an artifact of some powerful but unexplained
21We interpret these results as a further indication that lack of ﬁnancial development
accounts for the failure of some countries to converge to the growth rate of the global
technology frontier, a further corroboration of our theory, and a further indication of the
validity of our legal-origins instruments. If some factor other than ﬁnancial development is
primarily responsible for determining a country’s convergence status then that other factor
must not be one that is represented by any of the commonly cited explanatory variables
i n c l u d e di nT a b l e5 .
5C o n c l u s i o n
The paper has developed and tested a Schumpeterian model of cross-country convergence
with ﬁnancial constraints. The model is consistent with the broad facts of convergence and
divergence since the early 19th Century. It implies that all countries above some critical
level of ﬁnancial development should converge in growth rate, and that in such countries
ﬁnancial development has a positive but eventually vanishing eﬀect on steady-state GDP.
These implications were tested by estimating a cross-country growth regression with an
interaction term between ﬁnancial development and the country’s initial relative output.
As predicted, the coeﬃcient of this interaction term is negative and highly signiﬁcant, and
the direct eﬀect of ﬁnancial development is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero.
W h ys o m ec o u n t r i e sf a i lt oc o n v e r g ei ng r o w t hr a t e sd e s p i t et h ep o s s i b i l i t yo ft e c h n o l -
ogy transfer has been a puzzle. In combination with the contributions of Howitt (2000),
Acemoglu, Aghion and Zilibotti (2002) and Howitt and Mayer-Foulkes (2002) our theoret-
ical results show that Schumpeterian growth theory provides a framework for analyzing a
variety of forces that contribute to nonconvergence.36 Our empirical results suggest that
ﬁnancial development is among the most powerful of these forces, especially considering
that educational attainment, initial relative output and a large number of other candidate
variables do not have an analogous eﬀect when included in the same regression with ﬁnancial
development.37
eﬀect of the interacted legal-origins instruments on growth we redid all the estimations of Table 5 ﬁrst using
OLS, and then instrumenting for X and the interacted X variable instead of instrumenting for private credit
and private credit interacted. Under OLS the results conﬁrmed our main ﬁndings. Under the switched IV
estimation our main ﬁndings went through whenever the instruments were strong (i.e. whenever the p-value
of their joint F-test was larger than 0.2 in both ﬁrst-stage regressions.)
36See Galor and Weil (2000), Gollin et al. (2002) and Hansen and Prescott (2002) for alternative theories
of convergence and divergence based on the transition from agricultural to industrial technologies.
37Our results suggest that a country might escape divergence by using FDI as a substitute for lending
to local entrepreneurs. However, the results of Alfaro et al. (2003) indicate that FDI and local ﬁnance are
complements. Speciﬁcally, they ﬁn dt h a tF D Ih a sas i g n i ﬁcant eﬀect on growth only when interacted with
ﬁnance. This is consistent with the view that FDI results in technology transfer only when complemented
by the local entrepreneurial investments at the heart of our theory, which investments are impeded by lack
of ﬁnancial development.
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-0.015 -0.013 -0.016 -0.029 -0.030 -0.027 -0.019 -0.020 -0.022 0.000 0.031 0.013
(-0.93) (-0.68) (-0.78) (-1.04) (-0.99) (-0.90) (-1.07) (-1.03) (-1.12) (0.00) (0.17) (0.07)
  1.507***   1.193* 1.131   2.648***   2.388**   2.384**   1.891***   1.335* 1.365 7.166 5.279 5.645
(3.14) (1.86) (1.49) (3.12) (2.39) (2.11) (3.57) (1.93) (1.66) (1.04) (0.73) (0.72)
  -0.061***  -0.063***  -0.063*** -0.076***  -0.077***  -0.073***  -0.081***  -0.081***  -0.081*** -0.110 -0.100 -0.102
(-5.35) (-5.10) (-4.62) (-3.68) (-3.81) (-3.55) (-5.07) (-4.85) (-4.46) (-1.29) (-1.18) (-1.14)
Instrument test p-values
1
st-stage F-test:  F 0.0000 0.0014 0.0024 0.0044 0.0032 0.0042 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.2654 0.2180 0.1704
1
st-stage F-test:  F (y-y 1) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0690 0.0078 0.0088 0.0010 0.0003 0.0011 0.5160 0.2743 0.2962
1
st-stage F-test:  L (y-y 1) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0003 0.0002 0.0022 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.2329 0.2315 0.4516
Sargan test 0.5372 0.7255 0.5573 0.2217 0.3952 0.3627 0.8486 0.8816 0.8279 0.9661 0.8861 0.9223
C-test for  L (y-y 1) 0.3773 0.7013 0.4654 0.2700 0.3549 0.2799 0.9940 0.9642 0.8424 0.9482 0.7680 0.8240
C-test for  (y-y 1) 0.6475 0.7790 0.7781 0.6240 0.6341 0.6226 0.7699 0.9944 0.9784 0.9700 0.9818 0.9320
sample size 71 63 63 71 63 63 71 63 63 71 63 63
Table 1: Growth, Financial Development, and Initial GDP Gap
Estimation of equation:  g - g 1 = β 0 + β f F + β y (y - y 1) + β fy F (y-y 1) + β x X
Notes: The dependent variable g-g 1 is the average growth rate of per-capita real GDP relative to the United States, 1960-95. F is average Financial 
Development 1960-95 using four alternative measures, y - y 1 is the log of per-capita GDP in 1960 relative to the United States. 
aThe Policy conditioning 
set includes average years of schooling in 1960 (school), government size (gov), inflation (pi), black market premium (bmp) and openness to trade 
(trade). 
bThe Full conditioning set includes the policy set plus indicators of revolutions and coups (revc), political assassinations (assass) and ethnic 
diversity (avelf).  Appendix B gives a detailed description of all variables and indicates sources. Estimation is by IV using L (legal origins) and L (y-y 1) 





Private Credit Liquid Liabilities Bank Assets Commercial-Central Bank
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Switzerland Iceland Liberia
Japan Venezuela Syrian Arab Republic
United States Trinidad & Tobago Nepal
Sweden Chile Haiti
Netherlands Senegal Ghana





























Table 2: Convergence Club Membership
Notes: Financial development decreases, and hence the estimated convergence parameter increases, as 
you move down each list and then to the right. *The estimated convergence parameter is negative 
(indicating convergence) in countries above (and including) Belgium and positive (indicating divergence) 
in countries below Belgium.
Countries most likely to 
converge in growth rate
Countries uncertain to 
converge in growth rate
Countries most likely to 
diverge in growth rate
 24123456789
Financial development (F)








-0.006 -0.015 0.056 -0.039 -0.121 -0.127 -0.010 -0.052 0.043
(-0.16) (-0.15) (0.32) (-0.80) (-1.31) (-1.01) (-0.16) (-0.41) (0.19)
 1.666* 0.560 -0.670  2.313**  3.337* 3.745  1.980* 0.947 -0.139
(1.85) (0.34) (-0.26) (2.17) (1.76) (1.52) (1.80) (0.59) (-0.06)
  -0.091***  -0.096* -0.080  -0.062**  -0.116**  -0.126*  -0.093**  -0.107* -0.083




st-stage F-test:  F 0.0020 0.2471 0.5589 0.0007 0.1538 0.2915 0.0017 0.1033 0.3283
1
st-stage F-test:  F (y-y 1) 0.0043 0.0750 0.0717 0.0012 0.2249 0.3093 0.0025 0.0412 0.0477
sample size 41 38 38 41 38 38 41 38 38
Table 3: Estimation using Log Settler Mortality as instrument
Estimation of equation:  g - g 1 = β 0 + β f F + β y (y - y 1) + β fy F (y-y 1) + β x X




Notes: The dependent variable g-g 1 is the average growth rate of per-capita real GDP relative to the United States, 1960-95. F is average Financial 
Development 1960-95 using three alternative measures, y - y 1 is the log of per-capita GDP in 1960 relative to the United States. 
aThe Policy 
conditioning set includes average years of schooling in 1960 (school), government size (gov), inflation (pi), black market premium (bmp) and openness 
to trade (trade). 
bThe Full conditioning set includes the policy set plus indicators of revolutions and coups (revc), political assassinations (assass) and 
ethnic diversity (avelf).  
cOnly two of the four instrument tests of Table 1 can be performed because there are only as many settler-mortality instruments 
as endogenous variables, namely 2. Appendix B gives a detailed description of all variables and indicates sources. Estimation is by IV using the log of 
settler mortality and the log of settler mortality times (y-y 1) as instruments for F and F (y-y 1). The numbers in parentheses are t-statistics. Significance 
at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels is denoted by ***, ** and * respectively.
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Financial development (F)








-0.004 -0.008 -0.009 -0.028* -0.025 -0.026 -0.014 -0.016 -0.019
(-0.43) (-0.75) (-0.78) (-1.82) (-1.61) (-1.50) (-1.33) (-1.50) (-1.51)
0.844 0.633 0.496   3.402***   2.499**   2.662*   1.792*** 1.278 1.426
(1.66) (0.91) (0.57) (3.31) (2.19) (1.79) (2.95) (1.63) (1.35)
  -0.051***   -0.057***  -0.057***  -0.100***  -0.090***  -0.091***  -0.081***  -0.080***  -0.083***
(-4.19) (-4.15) (-3.46) (-4.06) (-3.88) (-3.26) (-4.63) (-4.37) (-3.60)
Instrument test p-values
1
st-stage F-test:  F 0.0000 0.0003 0.0008 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
1
st-stage F-test:  F (lna-lna 1) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0004 0.0045 0.0029 0.0111 0.0008 0.0007 0.0043
1
st-stage F-test:  L (lna-lna 1) 0.0001 0.0002 0.0017 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Sargan test 0.2803 0.3616 0.4555 0.8986 0.9081 0.9596 0.6381 0.6746 0.6873
C-test for  L (lna-lna 1) 0.1741 0.2604 0.6936 0.8427 0.8579 0.9111 0.6358 0.5075 0.8082
C-test for  (lna-lna 1) 0.8681 0.9888 0.9793 0.9306 0.7976 0.8103 0.8117 0.8080 0.7876
sample size 65 59 59 65 59 59 65 59 59
Table 4: Productivity Growth, Financial Development, and Initial Productivity Gap
Estimation of equation:  g - g 1 = β 0 + β f F + β a (lna - lna 1) + β fa F (lna-lna 1) + β x X




Notes: The dependent variable g-g 1 is the average growth rate of multi-factor producivity relative to the United States, 1960-95. F is average Financial 
Development 1960-95 using three alternative measures, lna - lna 1 is the log of productivity in 1960 relative to the United States. 
aThe Policy 
conditioning set includes average years of schooling in 1960 (school), government size (gov), inflation (pi), black market premium (bmp) and 
openness to trade (trade). 
bThe Full conditioning set includes the policy set plus indicators of revolutions and coups (revc), political assassinations 
(assass) and ethnic diversity (avelf).  Appendix B gives a detailed description of all variables and indicates sources. Estimation is by IV using L (legal 
origins) and L (lna - lna 1) as instruments for F and F (lna - lna 1). The numbers in parentheses are t-statistics. Significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% 
levels is denoted by ***, ** and * respectively.
26Category
Other variable (X) nothing y - y 1 
a school sec hy gschool ghy afr eq.  dist. pop100cr tropop
Coefficient estimates
-0.015 -0.015 -0.017 -0.019 -0.001 -0.015 -0.005 -0.008 -0.120 -0.015 -0.012
(-0.93) (-0.71) (-0.86) (-1.01) (-0.07) (-0.88) (-0.40) (-0.48) (-0.70) (-0.89) (-0.70)
 -0.061***  -0.061***  -0.061***  -0.057***  -0.041***  -0.061***  -0.043***  -0.053***  -0.046***  -0.063***  -0.053***
(-5.35) (-4.05) (-3.70) (-3.71) (-3.36) (-4.90) (-3.65) (-4.34) (-2.98) (-4.62) (-4.05)
1.711 0.158 0.442 0.910 0.229 0.328 -0.973 1.270 -0.849 -0.470
(0.97) (0.96) (0.96) (0.44) (0.55) (0.46) (-0.55) (0.58) (-0.56) (-0.40)
0.063 0.027 0.211 -1.836 0.036 -0.464 0.229 -1.105 -0.265 0.271
(0.15) (0.19) (0.61) (-1.30) (0.22) (-1.18) (0.29) (-0.66) (-0.38) (0.43)
Instrument test p-values
1
st-stage F-test:  F 0.0000 0.0001 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0002 0.0001 0.0004
1
st-stage F-test:  F (y-y 1) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0003 0.0002 0.0000 0.0005 0.0000 0.0024 0.0002 0.0005
1
st-stage F-test:  L (y-y 1) 0.0000 0.0001 0.0002 0.0005 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0054 0.0002 0.0010
Sargan test 0.5372 0.5303 0.4037 0.5468 0.1140 0.5624 0.8624 0.3411 0.5456 0.6136 0.7448
C-test for  L (y-y 1) 0.3773 0.3784 0.2598 0.4821 0.0849 0.6097 0.9093 0.4498 0.7742 0.5165 0.9116
C-test for  (y-y 1) 0.6475 0.6338 0.4270 0.4556 0.3299 0.6833 0.7071 0.5767 0.7645 0.6664 0.6422




Notes: The dependent variable g-g 1 is the average growth rate of per-capita real GDP relative to the United States, 1960-95. F is average Private 
Credit 1960-95, y - y 1 is the log of per-capita GDP in 1960 relative to the United States.
aWhen the other variable X is (y - y 1), the estimated equation 
is g - g 1 = β 0 + β f F +  β fy F (y-y 1) + β x (y-y 1) + β xy (y-y 1)
2. school is average years of schooling in 1960, sec is average years of secondary 
education 1960-95, hy is the Klenow-Rodriguez-Clare ratio of human capital to output, gschool is average growth rate of years of schooling 1960-95, 
ghy is the average growth rate of the human capital ratio 1960-85, afr is an African dummy, eq. dist is distance from the equator, pop100cr is measure 
of access to ocean-navigable waterways and tropop is the fraction of population living in the tropics.  Appendix B gives a detailed description of all 
variables and indicates sources. Estimation is by IV using L (legal origins) and L (y-y 1) as instruments for F and F (y-y 1). The numbers in 
parentheses are t-statistics. Significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels is denoted by ***, ** and * respectively.
β x
Table 5: Test for Other Interactions
Estimation of equation:  g - g 1 = β 0 + β y (y - y 1) +β f F +  β fy F (y-y 1) + β x X + β xy X (y - y 1)
Schooling Geography
27Category
Other variable (X) avgmort avgexpect me trade bus. reg. gov bmp pi soe avelf revc assass
Coefficient estimates
-0.011 -0.010 -0.006 -0.013 -0.010 -0.020 -0.018 -0.016 -0.014 -0.011 -0.020 -0.019
(-0.61) (-0.51) (-0.38) (-0.83) (-0.64) (-1.19) (-0.94) (-0.83) (-0.76) (-0.63) (-1.15) (-1.21)
 -0.046***  -0.047***  -0.046***  -0.062***  -0.052***  -0.067***  -0.065***  -0.060***  -0.056***  -0.056***  -0.063***  -0.062***
(-3.09) (-3.10) (-3.83) (-5.27) (-3.71) (-5.34) (-4.97) (-4.68) (-4.05) (-4.21) (-5.22) (-5.47)
-0.006 0.090 0.048 0.007 -0.300 0.124 -0.017 -0.007 0.080 1.013 -2.836 -0.700
(-1.62) (1.15) (0.31) (0.38) (-0.50) (1.48) (-1.00) (-0.26) (0.32) (0.52) (-1.12) (-0.73)
0.001 0.005 0.049 0.001 -0.247 0.067 -0.008 -0.003 0.068 0.952 -1.539 -0.169
(0.26) (0.13) (0.83) (0.09) (-0.68) (1.27) (-1.00) (-0.17) (0.47) (0.97) (-1.13) (-0.28)
Instrument test p-values
1
st-stage F-test:  F 0.0004 0.0009 0.0002 0.0001 0.0001 0.0002 0.0001 0.0003 0.0002 0.0000 0.0001 0.0001
1
st-stage F-test:  F (y-y 1) 0.0003 0.0003 0.0002 0.0000 0.0003 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0002 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000
1
st-stage F-test:  L (y-y 1) 0.0024 0.0016 0.0003 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0002 0.0003 0.0000 0.0000
Sargan test 0.3559 0.3499 0.5337 0.6917 0.3331 0.5287 0.7317 0.5057 0.3224 0.2865 0.5368 0.6461
C-test for  L (y-y 1) 0.2871 0.2503 0.6657 0.5326 0.3676 0.3809 0.8368 0.3516 0.5490 0.1890 0.5732 0.4823
C-test for  (y-y 1) 0.7671 0.7533 0.5061 0.6348 0.6343 0.2411 0.8726 0.6331 0.6344 0.6637 0.6744 0.6895
sample size 64 64 67 66 66 64 67 71 66 71 71 71
Notes: The dependent variable g-g 1 is the average growth rate of per-capita real GDP relative to the United States, 1960-95. F is average Private 
Credit 1960-95, y - y 1 is the log of per-capita GDP in 1960 relative to the United States, avgmort is average child mortality 1970-90, avgexpect is 
average life expectancy at birth 1960-90, me is malaria ecolocy, trade is openness to trade, bus. reg is an (inverse) index of the regulatory problems 
involved in opening a business, gov is government size, bmp is the black market premium, pi is the average inflation rate 1960-95, soe is an index of 
state-owned enterprises, avelf is an index of ethno-linguistic fractionalization, revc is an indicator of revolutions and coups, and assass is a measure of 
political assassinations.  Appendix B gives a detailed description of all variables and indicates sources. Estimation is by IV using L (legal origins) and L 







Table 5: Test for Other Interactions (continued)
Estimation of equation:  g - g 1 = β 0 + β y (y - y 1) +β f F +  β fy F (y-y 1) + β x X + β xy X (y - y 1)
Policy Socio-political stability
28Category
Other variable (X) bureau corrupt rulelaw pr.rights exprisk civil kkz infra statehist socap setmortal setmortal
c
Coefficient estimates
-0.018 -0.023 -0.019 -0.016 -0.022 -0.014 -0.024 -0.028 -0.015 -0.066 -1.078 -0.016
(-0.76) (-1.08) (-0.91) (-0.77) (-0.95) (-0.69) (-1.02) (-1.08) (-0.82) (-1.50) (-0.04) (-0.81)
 -0.060***  -0.058***  -0.054***  -0.055***  -0.053**  -0.057***  -0.061***  -0.062***  -0.055***  -0.079*** -1.914 -0.054***
(-3.59) (-3.54) (-3.03) (-2.68) (-2.19) (-3.58) (-2.91) (-2.85) (-4.51) (-2.53) (-0.04) (-3.95)
0.571* 0.231 0.533* 0.452 0.900* -0.212 1.012 3.880 0.058 0.695 -10.130 -0.476
(1.69) (0.99) (1.98) (0.68) (1.98) (-0.63) (1.30) (1.33) (0.04) (0.53) (-0.04) (-0.88)
0.401* 0.103 0.237 0.230 0.345 0.043 0.321 0.895 -0.812 -0.095 -13.058 -0.002
(2.00) (0.73) (1.29) (0.50) (0.95) (0.25) (0.60) (0.46) (-1.05) (-0.19) (-0.04) (-0.01)
Instrument test p-values
1













Sargan test 0.9283 0.6052 0.8538 0.3069 0.8416 0.8161 0.6674 0.7221 0.8497 0.3660
a -- 0.7501
C-test for  L (y-y 1) 0.9897 0.5727 0.7582 0.1914 0.8275 0.8066 0.5488 0.7543 0.9538 -- -- 0.7822
C-test for  (y-y 1) 0.6730 0.6558 0.7346 0.6539 0.9142 0.6860 0.6547 0.8011 0.6075 0.6849
a -- 0.7344
sample size 38 66 42 66 42 70 70 69 67 40 41 71
aNo Scandinavian legal origins in this sample. 
bNo Scandinavian or German legal origins in this sample. 
cSee footnote 34 in the text. Appendix B gives a 
detailed description of all variables and indicates sources. Estimation is by IV using L (legal origins) and L (y-y 1) as instruments for F and   F (y-y 1). 





Table 5: Test for Other Interactions (continued)
Estimation of equation:  g - g 1 = β 0 + β y (y - y 1) +β f F +  β fy F (y-y 1) + β x X + β xy X (y - y 1)
Notes: The dependent variable g-g 1 is the average growth rate of per-capita real GDP relative to the United States, 1960-95. F is average Private Credit 
1960-95, y - y 1 is the log of per-capita GDP in 1960 relative to the United States, bureau is an index of bureaucratic efficiency, corrupt is a measure of 
corruption, rulelaw is an index of the country's tradition of law and order, pr. rights is an index of strength of property rights, exprisk is an index of 
expropriation risk, civil is an index of civil liberties, kkz is a measure of the quality of governance, infra is a measure of social infrastructure, statehist is a 
measure of the antiquity of a state, socap is an index of social capability, and setmortal is the log of settler mortality.
Institutions
29Appendix A: Endogenizing the credit multiplier
This Appendix closely follows Aghion, Banerjee and Piketty (1999) in deriving a constant
credit multiplier from ex post enforcement considerations. More precisely, suppose that at
a non-monetary cost cNt an entrepreneur can hide the result of a successful innovation and
thereby avoid repaying her creditors, where 0 <c<1. This cost as an indicator of the
degree of creditor protection. In countries where laws and institutions make fraud a costly
option creditors are better protected and therefore, as we shall see, credit is more readily
available to entrepreneurs.
The entrepreneur must pay the hiding cost at the beginning of the period, when she
decides whether or not to be dishonest. She will do so when it is in her self interest, namely
when the following incentive-compatibility constraint is violated:
µβπAt+1 − cNt ≤ µβπAt+1 − µR · (Nt − wt) (19)
where R is the interest factor on the loan, Nt − wt is the size of the loan, and




is the innovation probability. The left-hand side of (19) is the expected payoﬀ from deciding
to be dishonest when investing at the rate Nt, whereas the right-hand side is the expected
payoﬀ from deciding to be honest. (If she does not successfully innovate her payoﬀ is zero,
because having invested all her wealth in the unsuccessful project she cannot be made to
repay anything.)
The only potential lenders in this OLG model are other young people, who will lend
only if oﬀered an expected rate of return equal to r ≡ β−1 − 1. Thus the interest factor on
the loan in equilibrium must satisfy not only the incentive-compatibility condition (19) but
also the arbitrage condition:
µR =1+r








30Appendix B: Sources and Description of Data
setmortal: Log of European settler mortality, Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001).
statehist: Measure of the antiquity of a state (1 to 1950 CE) regarding the existence
of native foreign government and the extent of the territory ruled by this government.
The measure used corresponds to statehist5 of the database in Bockstette, Chanda and
Putterman (2002).
avgexpect: Average life expectancy at birth for the years 1960-1990, Children Data Bank
for International.
socap: Measure of social capability deriving by Adelman and Morris (1967) using assess-
ment of each country’s development as of 1957-1962 in a variety of respects such as: extent
of urbanization, extent of dualism, extent of social mobility, extent of literacy, crude fertility
rate, degree of modernization of outlook, character of basic social organization, extent of
mass communication, size of traditional agricultural sector and importance of indigenous
middle class, Temple and Johnson (1998).
infra: Measure of social infrastructure (1986-1995) computed as the average of the GADP
and an openness measures. GADP is an index of government antidiversion policies includ-
ing law and order, bureaucratic quality, corruption, risk of expropriation and government
repudiation of contracts, Hall and Jones (1999).
avgmort: Average under-5 mortality rate for the years 1970-1990, Children Data Bank for
International.
pop100cr: Percentage of population within 100 km of ice-free coast, CID at Harvard
University. General Measures of Geography.
tropop: Percentage of population in geographical tropics, CID at Harvard University.
General Measures of Geography.
kkz: Composite index of six dimensions of governance: voice and accountability, political
stability and absence of violence, government eﬀectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law,
control of corruption, Kaufmann, Kraay and Zoido-Lobatón (1999).
me: Malaria Ecology. An ecologically-based variable that is predictive of the extent of
malaria transmission (Kiszewski et al., forthcoming). Malaria is intrinsically a disease of
warm environments because a key part of the life cycle of the parasite (sporogony) depends
on a high ambient temperature. Malaria also depends on adequate conditions of mosquito
breeding, mainly pools of clean water, usually due to rainfall ending up in puddles, cisterns,
discarded tires, and the like. Additionally, the intensity of malaria transmission depends
on the speciﬁc mosquito species that are present. The basic formula for Malaria Ecology
combines temperature, mosquito abundance, and mosquito vector type. The underlying
index is measured on a highly disaggregated sub-national level, and then averaged for the
entire country and weighted by population, TheE a r t hI n s t i t u t ea tC olumbia University.
bureau: An average of three indices published by Business International Corporation
(1984): eﬃciency of the judiciary system, red tape and corruption. The averages are over
the period 1980-1983.
exprisk: Expropriation risk. Assessment of risk of “outright conﬁscation” or “forced
nationalization”. It ranges from 0 to 10, with lower scores indicating a higher risk and
data are averaged over 1982-1995, Knack and Keefer (1995).
31lat_abst: Distance from the equator scaled between 0 and 1, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes,
Shleifer and Vishny (1998) - henceforth LLSV (1998).
pr. rights: Property rights. Rating of property rights on a scale from 0 to 5. The more
protection private property receives, the higher the score, LLSV (1998).
soe: Index of state owned enterprises (SOE). Measures the role of SOEs in the economy,
ranging from 0 to 10. Higher scores denote countries with less government owned enterprises,
which are estimated to produce less of the country’s output, LLSV (1998).
corruption: Measure of corruption, with the scale readjusted from 0 (high level of corrup-
tion) to 10 (low level). Data are averaged over 1982-1995, Knack and Keefer (1995).
assass: Number of assassinations per 1000 inhabitants, averaged over 1960-1990, Banks
(1994).
revc: Revolutions and coups. A revolution is deﬁned as any illegal or forced change in the
top of the governmental elite, any attempt at such a change, or any successful or unsuccessful
armed rebellion whose aim is independence from central government. Coup d’Etat is deﬁned
as an extraconstitutional or forced change in the top of the governmental elite and/or its
eﬀective control of the nation’s power structure in a given year. Unsuccessful coups are not
counted. Data are averaged over 1960-1990, Banks (1994).
avelf: Ethnic fractionalization. Average value of ﬁve indices of ethnolinguistic fraction-
alization, with values ranging from 0 to 1, where higher values denote higher levels of
fractionalization, Easterly and Levine (1998).
rulelaw: Measure of the law and order tradition in a country. It is an average over 1982-
1995. It ranges from 10, strong law and order tradition, to 1, weak law and order tradition,
LLSV(1998).
bus. reg: Business regulation. Rating of regulation policies related to opening and keeping
open a business. The scale is from 0 to 5, with higher scores meaning that regulations are
straightforward and applied uniformly to all businesses and that regulations are less of a
burden to business, LLSV (1998).
civil: Index of civil liberties, Freedom House 1994.
legal origins: Dummy variables for British (Eng), French (Fre), German (Ger) and Scan-
dinavian legal origins, LLSV (1998).
private credit: {(0.5)*[F(t)/Pe(t) + F(t-1)/Pe(t-1) ]}/[GDP(t)/ Pa(t)], where F is credit
by deposit money bank and other ﬁnancial institutions to the private sectors (lines 22d +
42d), GDP is line 99b, Pe is end- of period CPI (line 64) and Pa is the average CPI for the
year, IFS.
bank assets: {(0.5)*[F(t)/Pe(t) + F(t-1)/Pe(t-1) ]}/[GDP(t)/ Pa(t)], where F is domestic
assets of deposit money banks (lines 22a-d), GDP is line 99b, Pe is end- of period CPI (line
64) and Pa is the average CPI for the year, IFS.
liquid liabilities: {(0.5)*[F(t)/Pe(t) + F(t-1)/Pe(t-1) ]}/[GDP(t)/ Pa(t)], where F is
liquid liabilities (line 55), GDP is line 99b, Pe is end- of period CPI (line 64) and Pa is the
average CPI for the year, IFS.
commercial-central bank: DBA(t)/(DBA(t) + CBA(t)), where DBA is assets of deposit
money banks (lines 22a-d) and CBA is central bank assets (lines 12a-d), IFS.
bmp: Black market premium: Ratio of black market exchange rate and oﬃcial exchange
rate minus one, Picks’ Currency Yearbook through (1989) and the World Currency Year-
book.
32sec: Average years of secondary schooling in the population over 15 from 1960-1995, Barro
and Lee (1996).
school: Average years of schooling in the population over 25 in 1960, Barro and Lee (1996).
pi:I n ﬂation rate. Log diﬀerence of consumer price index average from 1960-1995, IFS (line
64).
trade: Openness to trade. Sum of real exports and imports as a share of real GDP average
1960-1995, Levine, Loayza and Beck (2000), henceforth LLB.
gov: Government expenditure as a share of GDP average 1960-1995, LLB (2000).
africa: Dummy for countries in the African continent.
y-y1:D i ﬀerence between log per-capita real GDP 1960 in each country and the USA, LLB
(2000).
gschool: Average annual growth rate of schooling from 1960 to 1995, LLB (2000).
hy: 1985 human-capital to output ratio, Klenow and Rodríguez-Clare (1997).
ghy: 1960-1985 annual growth rate of human capital to output ratio, Klenow and Rodríguez-
Clare (1997).
lna - lna1: The log of productivity in 1960 relative to the USA, Benhabib and Spiegel
(2002).
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